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> Context • The integration of sensorimotor signals and prior beliefs contribute to our sense of body. An influential 
framework in the study of the bodily self is Gallagher’s distinction between body image and body schema, which 
are roughly comparable to the perceived body and the lived body, respectively. Through systematic manipulations of 
sensorimotor signals, it is possible to induce the illusion of agency or ownership over foreign limbs or full bodies. Yet, 
there is diverging empirical evidence regarding the coherence of sensorimotor signals necessary to elicit such illusions. 
> problem • The large amount of empirical evidence and its relation to the concepts of body image and schema is 
not well understood and requires more fine-graded distinctions of various aspects of sensorimotor coherences. 
> method • We systematically discuss literature on sensorimotor coherence during bodily illusions and argue for the 
importance of distinguishing between head- and limb-related coherences. To support this discussion, we present new 
experimental findings where participants experienced a first-person perspective (1PP) full-body illusion over another 
human through the manipulation of hand-related visuotactile or visuomotor coherence. > results • Participants 
showed no significant reduction in ownership after asynchronous visuotactile, but after asynchronous visuomotor 
stimulation. Based on these results and the literature, we propose that head-related temporal sensorimotor 
coherences are necessary to integrate limb-related incoherent signals during full-body illusions. Furthermore, we 
speculate that during full-body illusions, head-related coherences are a binding factor between the body image and 
the body schema; that is, only through the coherent manipulation of the visual field over a 1PP resulting from an 
immersive image (body image) is our body schema manipulated. > implications • While yet to be experimentally 
tested, distinguishing head- and limb-related sensorimotor integration and their influences on body image and 
body schema could refine the study of the bodily self. > Constructivist content • The plasticity of the bodily self – 
as shown in bodily illusions – reflects the dynamism of the subject as observer and its binding to its environment.
> Key words • Bodily self, sensorimotor integration, body schema, body image, bodily illusions.
the bodily self and 
its alteration through 
sensorimotor stimulation
« 1 » in both theoretical and empiri-
cal work, there is growing evidence that 
the brain actively constructs our sense of a 
bodily self from multisensory afferents (e.g., 
visual, vestibular, tactile or proprioceptive), 
motor efferents, and longer-term assump-
tions about the self (e.g., Blanke, slater & 
serino 2015). over the last decades, an in-
creasing number of empirical studies have 
developed experimental setups that system-
atically manipulate the coherences between 
different sensorimotor signals1 to investigate 
1 | We use the term sensorimotor to refer to 
the integration either of multiple sensory or of 
sensory and motor signals.
various aspects of the bodily self. These 
studies typically induce illusory self-identi-
fication with an external body part to study 
the feeling of ownership (the experience of 
the body being one’s own) and the feeling of 
agency (the experience of self-generating an 
action), which have been argued to be the 
most crucial aspects of the bodily self (see, 
e.g., Gallagher 2000; Longo et al. 2008). in 
this framework, it is broadly accepted that 
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both integrative and competitive dynamic 
relations of sensorimotor information about 
the body contribute to the unity of the bodi-
ly self and its stability over time. in other 
words, the sense of one’s own body results 
from a probabilistic integration of informa-
tion from sensorimotor signals and from be-
liefs based on previous experiences (apps & 
tsakiris 2014; Limanowski & Blankenburg 
2013). Yet, so far, it has not been possible 
to integrate the large amount of – partially 
contradictory – empirical findings into a 
unified model of the bodily self. Moreover, 
the manner of interaction between the dif-
ferent sensory inputs and their potential to 
modulate prior beliefs with respect to bodily 
illusions remain largely unclear.
« 2 » We here intend to disentangle 
some of the lesser discussed characteristics 
of sensorimotor coherences during bodily 
illusions and attempt to integrate these 
properties into the influential framework of 
body image and body schema, as proposed 
by shaun Gallagher (2005b). For Gallagher, 
the body image is related to how the body 
appears in one’s perceptual field while the 
body schema is related to how the body 
shapes or constrains such a perceptual field. 
We will discuss how these two concepts, 
though dissociated, might interact during 
bodily illusions.2 it is generally thought that 
for illusory embodiment to occur, temporal 
sensorimotor coherence is necessary, albeit 
not sufficient (Botvinick & Cohen 1998; 
tsakiris & Haggard 2005); however, recent 
results show that in some cases illusory 
embodiment can be achieved despite tem-
poral sensorimotor incoherence (Caola et 
al. 2018; Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & slat-
er 2013; slater et al. 2010). in light of this 
divergence, we suggest the need to refine 
particular aspects of sensorimotor coher-
ences. Most importantly, visuopropriocep-
tive coherence is often referred to as a single 
process, but integration mechanisms might 
differ between effectors (e.g., movement of 
peripheral limbs as compared to movement 
of the head). We will discuss
2 | While the literature regarding the body 
image and schema is extensive and has been dis-
cussed by several authors including Jacques Pail-
lard, Marc Jeannerod and Jonathan Cole, we here 
focus on the distinction as discussed by Gallagher 
(2005a, 2005b).
  diverging evidence regarding the ne-
cessity of temporal sensorimotor co-
herence for inducing body ownership 
illusions;
  how head-related sensorimotor signals 
have been neglected in the literature 
(but we speculate that they may help 
explain this diverging evidence); and
  how such head-related signals may be 
an important factor for the interaction 
between body schema and body image 
during illusory ownership.
of the many methods of manipulating the 
bodily self that have emerged over the past 
decades, we will focus on two classes of il-
lusions that manipulate visual, tactile, pro-
prioceptive, vestibular, and/or motor sig-
nals from a first-person perspective (1PP): 
illusory limb identification and the first-
person perspective full-body illusion.3
types of experimentally 
induced illusions of the 
bodily self
illusory limb identification
« 3 » during illusory limb identifica-
tion (iLi), a fake limb at a spatially differ-
ent location is felt as one’s own. This is the 
case, for example, in the well-known rub-
ber Hand illusion (rHi; Botvinick & Co-
hen 1998): in this paradigm, participants 
see a rubber hand located in an anatomi-
cally plausible position, which is touched or 
stroked synchronously with their own hand 
(which is positioned out of view but next to 
the rubber hand). The temporally coherent 
visuotactile feedback in the rHi supersedes 
the visuoproprioceptive conflict, resulting 
in illusory ownership over the fake hand (in 
3 | other experimental manipulations of 
the bodily self that require different or additional 
categorizations will not be covered in the current 
article; these include the manipulation of intero-
ceptive (aspell et al. 2013; suzuki et al. 2013), au-
ditory (tajadura-Jiménez et al. 2012; tajadura-Ji-
ménez et al. 2016), or passive vestibular (Macauda 
et al. 2015) signals, as well as manipulations from 
different perspectives such as the enfacement par-
adigm (sforza et al. 2010; tsakiris 2008) or full-
body illusions from a third-person perspective 
(Ehrsson 2007; Lenggenhager et al. 2007).
the majority of participants). such illusory 
embodiment has also been demonstrated 
for other limbs, such as the foot (Flögel et 
al. 2016; Lenggenhager, Hilti & Brugger 
2015), and with other sensory and motor 
temporal couplings, such as visual and pro-
prioceptive (rohde, Luca & Ernst 2011) or 
visual and motor (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012, 
2014; ratcliffe & newport 2017; sanchez-
vives et al. 2010), with this latter case ad-
ditionally resulting in illusory agency over 
the fake hand. it has been suggested that 
the fake limb must be anatomically cred-
ible both in shape (as no illusion occurs for 
anatomically implausible objects) and pos-
tural position (tsakiris & Haggard 2005). 
What distinguishes iLi from sensorimotor 
manipulation of the full body is that partic-
ipants perceive illusory ownership over an 
external/supernumerary dummy body part 
while maintaining a natural 1PP over their 
own bodies and environment.
First-person perspective full-body 
illusion
« 4 » in the case of the first-person per-
spective full-body illusion (1PP FBi), the 
body of the participants, who are wearing 
head-mounted displays (HMds), is substi-
tuted by the view of either a virtual (Maselli 
et al. 2016; Maselli & slater 2013; slater et 
al. 2010), a manikin’s (Petkova & Ehrsson 
2008), or another person’s body (Bertrand et 
al. 2014; Petkova & Ehrsson 2008). similar 
to the case of iLi, at least some correspon-
dence of motor, tactile, vestibular, and/or 
proprioceptive signals between the partici-
pant’s own body and the one they see seems 
necessary (see Maselli & slater 2013). such 
manipulations can result in illusory owner-
ship and/or agency over the seen body. The 
particularity of the 1PP FBi is that both the 
whole body and the perceptual field of the 
participant are visually exchanged with that 
of the illusion. Yet, the 1PP over this foreign 
body remains natural; that is, the virtual 
visual field matches the participant’s head 
position and orientation. it is worth not-
ing, however, that in many 1PP FBi setups, 
the 1PP perspective is restricted by asking 
participants to avoid head movements, thus 
limiting head-related sensorimotor inter-
actions (Petkova & Ehrsson 2008; Petkova, 
Khoshnevis & Ehrsson 2011).
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Disentangling 
characteristics 
of sensorimotor integration 
during illusory embodiment
the importance of temporal 
incoherence in illusory embodiment
« 5 » temporally coherent sensorimo-
tor stimulation has been considered a nec-
essary component for iLi to occur. in con-
trast, temporally incoherent sensorimotor 
stimulation generally reduces the illusion 
and has been used as a control condition for 
sensorimotor stimulation without illusory 
embodiment (please refer to table 1 for an 
overview of how sensorimotor coherences 
affect ownership in selected studies). asyn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation typically 
results in a significantly weaker feeling of 
ownership (Botvinick & Cohen 1998), while 
asynchronous visuomotor stimulation leads 
to lower scores in the sense of both owner-
ship and agency (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012, 
2014). This has been assessed explicitly, us-
ing questionnaires, as well as implicitly, us-
ing measures like proprioceptive drift (i.e., 
people’s perception of the location of their 
own limb is biased towards the fake limb) or 
physiological reaction (typically in response 
to a threat towards the illusorily embodied 
limb). it is important to distinguish between 
two types of sensorimotor incoherence: spa-
tial shifts and temporal shifts. an example 
of a spatial shift is the visuoproprioceptive 
interaction during the rHi, where the seen 
(fake) hand is in a different position from 
the participant’s own hand, yet the spatial 
difference remains constant. That is, even 
though there is a difference between the in-
formation from proprioception and vision, 
the spatial relation between the two signals 
remains the same throughout the stimula-
tion procedure. in contrast, during temporal 
shifts, the relation between the different sen-
sorimotor signals is dynamic. an example of 
the latter, in the case of visuoproprioceptive 
temporal incoherence, would be when the 
participant’s own hand is moved while the 
rubber hand remains stationary.
« 6 » in the case of 1PP FBis, diverging 
results concerning the necessity of temporal 
sensorimotor coherence have been reported 
by the few available studies (refer to table 1 
for an overview). While some studies found 
that asynchronous visuotactile stimulation 
significantly reduces the illusion as in iLi 
(Petkova & Ehrsson 2008; Petkova, Khosh-
nevis & Ehrsson 2011), others show that 
it does not (Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & 
slater 2013; and slater et al. 2010, for some 
elements of their questionnaire). antonella 
Maselli and Mel slater’s (2013) work is par-
ticularly illustrative in that they proposed a 
model integrating the building blocks of il-
lusory full-body ownership. in their model, 
the crucial components are
  a natural view of the body from a 1PP 
with a clear resemblance to a human 
body and
  a high coherence of visuoproprioceptive 
cues.
if these conditions are met, then visuotactile 
temporal incoherence does not reduce the 
illusion – a phenomenon that is remarkably 
different from what has been found for iLi. 
if these conditions are not met, then visuo-
tactile temporal coherence may still elicit 
the illusion (i.e., in iLi).
« 7 » Whereas Maselli, slater, and col-
leagues (Maselli et al. 2016; slater et al. 2010) 
used virtual characters, we confirmed their 
findings using live videos of another human 
being (cf. section “Empirical study” for these 
previously unpublished data). it needs to be 
noted that we included a slight visuoproprio-
ceptive shift in space (10 cm) between the 
seen and the participant’s own hand, compa-
rable to the classical rHi. Even in this condi-
tion, visuotactile temporal incoherence did 
not break the illusion, suggesting that under 
certain circumstances, the visuopropriocep-
tive correspondence needed to induce the il-
lusion can be lower than previously thought 
(Maselli & slater 2013). importantly, these 
authors did not distinguish between pro-
prioceptive spatial and temporal shifts when 
referring to incoherence, despite different 
effects of each type of visuoproprioceptive 
incoherence on the rHi (tsakiris & Haggard 
2005). However, if we assume some flexibil-
ity in visuoproprioceptive correspondence in 
space, why would temporally incoherent sen-
sorimotor signals not result in illusory own-
ership in the case of iLi? This unexplained 
difference in the integration of incoherent 
signals between iLi and 1PP FBi points at a 
need for a more detailed model that accom-
modates such loose temporal integration of 
sensorimotor signals for embodiment dur-
ing 1PP FBis. to this end, we propose a dif-
ferentiation of head-related and limb-related 
sensorimotor integration, which will be dis-
cussed in the following subsection.
« 8 » Maselli et al. (2016) tested whether 
a humanoid computer-generated body dur-
ing a 1PP FBi with active head movements 
results in a longer temporal binding window 
for visuotactile integration than an implau-
sible body. in their experiment, the implau-
sible body consisted of two virtual wooden 
sticks in a position corresponding to the 
body as seen from 1PP. They showed that 
when participants embodied the humanoid 
body, they were less sensitive to temporal 
sensorimotor incoherence. such variation in 
the temporal binding window for sensorim-
otor integration can be considered evidence 
for how the particular properties of the 1PP 
FBi can affect sensorimotor integration. it 
suggests that an immersive representation 
of a realistic full body that corresponds 
to the head’s orientation (within certain 
boundaries of spatial visuoproprioceptive 
correspondence) can widen the window of 
sensorimotor integration. our own results 
confirm and extend this finding (cf. section 
“Empirical study”) by showing that the feel-
ing of ownership occurred not only when 
embodying a virtual character, but also in 
an online video of a human body, regardless 
of temporal synchrony4 during visuotactile 
stimulation. in contrast, to our knowledge, 
relaxed constraints for temporal sensorimo-
tor coherence have not been reported for 
iLis (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012, 2014; tsa-
kiris & Haggard 2005; Botvinick & Cohen 
1998).
« 9 » along these lines, a recent study 
(Caola et al. 2018) used a 1PP FBi setup with 
4 | our data further speak against the hy-
pothesis that asynchronous visuotactile stimula-
tion significantly reduces the illusion in video-
based setups (Petkova & Ehrsson 2008; Petkova 
et al. 2011), while it does not in computer-gener-
ated setups (Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & slater 
2013; slater et al. 2010). it could be argued that 
the medium of stimulation changes expectations 
and thus affects how sensorimotor signals are in-
tegrated, yet our data show similar effects to the 
computer-generated setups (cf. section “Empiri-
cal study”). This medium-based contrast was also 
questioned by Petkova et al. (2011) comparing 
HMd versus stimulation without digital devices.
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type medium
Limb-related coherences
optic 
flow
Difference in 
ownership during 
mismatch
reference
independent variable 
of interest and mismatch 
type
initial mismatch 
and type
implicit 
measure
explicit 
measure
ILI Physical VT (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes yes Botvinick & Cohen 1998
ILI Physical VT (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched no yes Flögel et al. 2016
ILI Physical VT (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched no yes Lenggenhager et al. 2015
ILI Physical VT (temporal) and no touch
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes no Rohde et al. 2011
ILI Physical VM (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes yes Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012, 2014
ILI Physical VM (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes yes Ratcliffe & Newport 2017
ILI 3D screen VM (temporal)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes yes Sánchez-Vives et al. 2010
ILI Physical
VT (temporal), 
proprioceptive postural 
(spatial)
Proprioceptive 
(spatial)
matched yes n/a Tsakiris & Haggard 2005
1PP FBI HMD (VR)
VT (temporal and spatial), 
body shape
n/a matched n/a yes (a) Maselli et al. 2016
1PP FBI HMD (VR)
VT & VM (temporal), body 
shape
n/a
matched/
fixed
no no Maselli and Slater 2013
1PP FBI HMD (VR) VT (temporal) n/a
matched 
(b)
yes 
(VT only)
for some 
items Slater et al. 2010
1PP FBI HMD (video) VT (temporal) n/a fixed yes yes Petkova & Ehrsson 2008
1PP FBI
HMD (video), 
physical
VT (temporal) n/a fixed yes yes Petkova, Khoshnevis & Ehrsson 2011
1PP FBI HMD (VR)
VT and visuoproprioceptive 
(temporal)
n/a matched n/a for some cases Caola et al. 2018
1PP FBI HMD (VR) VM (spatial and temporal) n/a matched yes no Kokkinara et al. 2015
1PP FBI HMD (VR) n/a Proprioceptive & postural (temporal) partial (c)
for 
perspective
for 
perspective Kokkinara et al. 2016
Table 1 • Systematic literature overview over the two experimentally induced illusions of the bodily self that are central to this target article: 
illusory limb identification (ILI) and first-person perspective full-body illusion (1PP FBI). The table shows the type of illusion, the manipulated 
parameters of interest (limb- and head-related), the sensorimotor coupling (visuotactile and visuomotor couplings are coded as VT and VM, 
respectively), the type of mismatch (temporal or spatial), whether the optic flow was coherent with head movements, and if there was a sig-
nificant difference in the measures of ownership. HMD refers to head-mounted display. Please note that this is an oversimplified overview and 
each paper has many subtleties to be considered. The variables shown are the ones relevant to our discussion, not necessarily the only ones 
manipulated in the studies. Notes: (a) Not a measure of embodiment but of the temporal binding of visuotactile signals. (b) Head movements 
of the avatar were not matched, but optic flow (i.e., the apparent motion of the visual surroundings from a 1PP perspective) was. (c) A condi-
tion included head sway while participants were not swaying, yet orientation was coherent to head movements there, which affected the 
perceived agency.
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active head movements to demonstrate that 
participants feel ownership for a moving 
virtual arm even when they are not physi-
cally moving (i.e., with large temporal inco-
herence). similarly, Elena Kokkinara et al. 
(2016) showed that seated participants who 
were only allowed head movement in a 1PP 
FBi setup experienced illusory ownership 
over a walking body. Both studies are in line 
with the idea that there is a larger tolerance 
for sensorimotor incoherence in 1PP FBi 
setups,5 which is not the case for iLi.
« 10 » That temporal constraints for 
sensorimotor integration are relaxed during 
1PP FBis is also consistent with the model 
of Maselli et al. (2016), which includes the 
point that mismatching sensorimotor cues 
are more loosely integrated when there is a 
strong feeling of ownership over a complete 
foreign body. The authors argue that body 
ownership illusions function as a causal 
binding factor for sensorimotor integration. 
They refer to a Bayesian inference model 
when they write that
“ the illusion arises when the brain associates a 
higher than chance probability to the existence of 
a single cause (the own-body) for all the incom-
ing sensory input: the visual from the fake body 
and the somatosensory/motor from the physical 
body.” (ibid: 6)
This approach is highly explanatory and 
corresponds to our own evidence of relaxed 
temporal constraints for sensorimotor in-
tegration under 1PP FBis. However, we 
propose that specifically head-related sen-
sorimotor signals allow for such binding of 
sensorimotor integration during body own-
ership illusions.
the importance of head- versus 
limb-related coherences in illusory 
embodiment
« 11 » The (probabilistic) integration 
of proprioception, vision, and touch has 
been considered an important aspect of 
(illusory) embodiment since the seminal 
5 | These temporal mismatches, however, 
were passive: participants were not moving their 
bodies (apart from the head) while they saw mov-
ing bodies; this is in contrast to the (active) visuo-
motor task presented in the section “Empirical 
study.”
rHi (Botvinick & Cohen 1998). We argue, 
however, that for both iLi and 1PP FBi, the 
full complexity of such integration has often 
been neglected. as illustrated above, visuo-
proprioceptive mismatch can be spatial or 
temporal, and both have been shown to dif-
ferentially influence illusory embodiment. 
Furthermore, while sensorimotor coherence 
is usually just manipulated for peripheral 
limbs, head-related visuoproprioceptive co-
herence is much less discussed or manipu-
lated in this literature (see table 1).6 There 
are, however, important fundamental differ-
ences between limb- and head-related sen-
sorimotor signals7:
  head-related changes not only modify 
the visual inputs of the limb but of the 
whole scene; and
  head-related changes not only affect vi-
suoproprioceptive but also visuovestib-
ular coherence (see also Lenggenhager 
& Lopez 2014, for a more extensive de-
bate).
« 12 » While the vestibular system has 
been claimed to be crucial for various as-
pects of the bodily self, it has hardly been 
discussed in current models of illusory em-
bodiment (see Blanke, slater & serino 2015; 
Pfeiffer, serino & Blanke 2014; Lenggenha-
ger & Lopez 2014 for exceptions) or spe-
cifically manipulated experimentally (see 
Macauda et al. 2015 for an exception). one 
way in which visuovestibular interaction has 
been accounted for during 1PP FBis is the 
so-called “redirected walking” technique 
(see nilsson et al. 2018, for a review). By 
mapping the virtual to the physical space 
in a ratio other than 1:1, locomotion in the 
physical world is slightly (to the level that it 
is not consciously perceived) mismatched 
6 | While our argument focuses on the rela-
tionship between vision and other sensory modal-
ities, the special status of head-related movements 
extends to audition. during head movements, 
the sensorimotor rules that govern our visual 
field change as much for audition. When acoustic 
waves reach the middle ear, they change as a func-
tion of their angular incidence with our heads and 
pinnae (see Cheng & Wakefield 2001). Even more 
so, auditory cues are almost always manipulated 
by our head but rarely by our limb movements.
7 | Please note that even different properties 
might be found for eye-movement-related visuo-
proprioceptive integration.
with locomotion in the virtual world. For ex-
ample, if a person wants to see herself (from 
a 1PP) walking in a straight line in the virtu-
al world, there may be a slight mismatch so 
that in the physical world, she has to move 
in a curved way to achieve such motion. The 
effect can be pronounced, particularly when 
visual input is combined with other sensory 
modalities, to the point that participants feel 
that they are walking in an infinite straight 
line while actually walking in circles (nils-
son et al. 2018). similar to the precedence of 
vision in illusory ownership over peripheral 
limbs, vision seems to also dominate propri-
oceptive and vestibular cues in the presence 
of sensorimotor mismatches in FBis. Fur-
thermore, a small visuovestibular mismatch 
in head movements, such as during walking 
in a virtual body with or without head sway, 
has resulted in illusory ownership in a 1PP 
FBi setup with active head tracking (Kok-
kinara, et al. 2015). But this does not yet 
answer our question: do head-related versus 
limb-related visuoproprioceptive and motor 
cues differentially affect bodily illusions?
« 13 » While some authors limited head 
movement during 1PP FBis (Maselli & slat-
er 2013; Petkova & Ehrsson 2008; Petkova, 
Khoshnevis & Ehrsson 2011), only a few 
have systematically investigated the effects 
of head-related sensorimotor coherences 
on illusory embodiment (see table  1 for 
an overview of the literature). notably, this 
manipulation of head-related signals is not 
easy to achieve in iLi. in Maselli and slater’s 
(2013) study, participants were either able to 
freely move their heads or had to keep them 
static, which did not have a significant effect 
on the embodiment results. although there 
was no visual-field movement in the control 
group in this study, the perspective over the 
body and the proprioceptive coherence re-
mained matched. However, limiting head 
movements does not allow us to dissociate 
visuoproprioceptive correspondence of the 
peripheral body and visuoproprioceptive 
correspondence of head movements. in-
terestingly, their results showed that when 
asynchronous touch was used during active, 
rather than limited, head movements, par-
ticipants attributed the origin of the tactile 
sensations to the visual (virtual) source. 
These findings suggest that head movements 
influence the integration of sensorimotor 
signals related to embodiment.
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« 14 » an earlier study by the same 
group manipulated the synchrony of head 
movements (slater et al. 2010). However, 
asynchrony affected only the movements 
of the virtual avatar’s head (as seen in a 
virtual mirror) but not the field of view 
of the participants, which always matched 
the participant’s head movements, even if 
the avatar’s head did not. The experiment 
included asking participants whether they 
recognized themselves in the mirror as the 
avatar, which was more likely for synchro-
nous than for asynchronous head move-
ments. Yet, the feeling that the avatar’s body 
was their own body was not influenced by 
the synchrony of head movements. These 
results point to a difference between how 
head-related optic-flow coherence (the ap-
parent motion of the visual surroundings 
from an egocentric perspective) and pe-
ripheral visuoproprioceptive coherence are 
processed.
« 15 » The direct comparison between 
a head-related and a limb-related system 
of visuoproprioceptive integration is some-
thing that, to our knowledge, has not been 
experimentally tested. From a technical 
perspective, this can easily be implemented 
with the use of HMds and head tracking. 
in this sense, 1PP FBi, in contrast to iLi, 
offers a unique possibility to disentangle 
both systems of proprioceptive integration. 
it needs to be noted that a visuovestibular 
mismatch between the visual field and head 
movements may result in acute nausea; 
nevertheless, apart from the problems that 
this may entail, current technology allows 
for the manipulation of head-related coher-
ences, as demonstrated by redirected walk-
ing (see above). alternatively, head move-
ments with a static field of view could be 
tested. Furthermore, eye movements could 
be tracked during the task, which may 
have an additional influence on 1PP FBi 
(see Footnote 4). so far, we know that if we 
maintain visuomotor (and proprioceptive) 
correspondence of head movements, illuso-
ry ownership may be maintained even if we 
break temporal sensorimotor coherence for 
peripheral limbs. However, we do not know 
what happens when such temporal coher-
ence for head movements is broken. Would 
we still be able to elicit illusory ownership 
over the seen body? if we were to find that 
head-related temporal incoherence would 
suffice to significantly reduce the illusion 
even during temporally coherent sensorim-
otor stimulation for peripheral limbs, we 
should integrate this into current models.8
« 16 » in our 1PP-FBi scenario, disso-
ciating head- from limb-related coherences 
would result in a special case of visuopro-
prioceptive integration. special not only due 
to its seemingly distinct mechanisms, but 
also for being of fundamental importance 
for the bodily self. Yet, this has to be em-
pirically tested. While it has been suggested 
that third-person-perspective sensorimotor 
manipulations may elicit out-of-body-like 
illusions (Ehrsson 2007; Lenggenhager et al. 
2007), we have provided arguments for the 
importance of 1PP visuoproprioceptive co-
herence for illusory identification with a full 
humanoid body, which maintains bodily il-
lusions even with asynchronous sensorimo-
tor signals to peripheral limbs (Caola et al. 
2018; Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & slater 
2013; slater et al. 2010). a 1PP over a hu-
manoid body can serve as a “causal binding 
factor” (Maselli et al. 2016): an integrator 
between implausible sensorimotor signals 
and the feeling of self-identification with a 
fake body. However, could a 1PP also repre-
sent an integrator of body image and body 
schema?
empirical study: Synchro-
nous and asynchronous 
visuotactile and visuomotor 
hand stimulation while full-
body swapping with another 
human
aim and hypotheses
« 17 » our study tested whether taking 
the perspective of a another human (i.e., not 
computer-generated but video-based) with 
matching head movements would confirm 
that illusory ownership during 1PP FBi is 
robust to certain sensorimotor mismatches 
(Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & slater 2013; 
8 | it is interesting to note that experimen-
tally induced dizziness, or dizziness induced by 
clinical conditions can increase disorders of the 
bodily self, such as symptoms of depersonaliza-
tion (Lopez & Elzière 2017).
slater et al. 2010). in particular, we hypoth-
esized that asynchronous visuotactile stimu-
lation would not significantly reduce owner-
ship as measured using proprioceptive drift 
and questionnaires (even with an initial 
visuoproprioceptive mismatch; see below). 
regarding visuomotor synchrony, we did 
not have a clear hypothesis since previously 
reported methods and results varied widely.
methods and procedure
« 18 » 18 young healthy participants (8 
men and 10 women; mean age = 29.7 years) 
adopted the visual perspective of another 
(female) person (the “performer”) using 
“The Machine to Be another” system (Ber-
trand et al. 2018; oliveira et al. 2016; Ber-
trand et al. 2014; cf. Figure  1). The system 
uses a motorized video camera feeding the 
visual perspective of the performer into a 
head-mounted display (HMd) used by the 
participants. Head-related visuomotor co-
herences over the performer were always 
synchronous, active, and not restricted (un-
like other video-based setups such as Petko-
va & Ehrsson 2008; Petkova, Khoshnevis & 
Ehrsson 2011), enabling a completely natu-
ral perspective on the other person’s body. 
The manipulation of limb-related senso-
rimotor coherence was limited to the right 
hand and, in contrast to previous studies, we 
induced a slight initial visuoproprioceptive 
mismatch (i.e., the participant’s hand was 
located at 10 cm from the seen hand) similar 
to the classical rubber hand illusion (rHi) 
paradigm. a repeated-measures experiment 
with four (counterbalanced) conditions 
based on the domain of the sensorimotor 
manipulation (visuotactile and visuomotor) 
and synchrony (synchronous and asynchro-
nous) was conducted. For the visuotactile 
domain, an assistant stroked the index finger 
of both the performer and the participant ei-
ther synchronously or asynchronously (op-
posing the direction of the touch) at a rate of 
approximately 1 Hz, as in the classical rHi. 
For the visuomotor domain, participants 
moved their right hand slowly while main-
taining the forearm on top of a platform. The 
performer observed the participant’s hand 
and either followed its movements with her 
own hand (synchronous) or moved it ran-
domly (asynchronous). as mentioned, the 
participant’s hand was shifted 10 cm to the 
right of the seen hand to enable the proprio-
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ceptive drift measure. after each condition, 
participants were asked to fill in a question-
naire consisting of 12 questions that could 
be answered on a 7-point Likert scale rang-
ing from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree” (adapted from Longo et al. 2008, and 
Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012). For conceptual 
reasons, we focused on the subscales “body 
ownership” (3 items: “i felt as if the hand 
that i was seeing was part of my body,” “i felt 
as if i was seeing my own hand,” and “i felt as 
if the hand that i was seeing was my hand”) 
and agency (3 items: “i felt as if i could cause 
movements of the hand that i was seeing,” 
“The hand that i was seeing was obeying my 
will” and “i can make it move just like i want 
it to”), which were compared for each con-
dition. For the visuotactile conditions, we 
additionally measured proprioceptive drift: 
before and after stimulation (with the HMd 
turned off) participants would have to point 
(with the non-stimulated hand) to the posi-
tion of the stimulated hand under the table. 
in our setup, a null drift value corresponds 
to the perceived location of the stimulated 
hand being where it is located, while posi-
tive drift values refer to the stimulated hand 
being perceived as closer to the seen hand, 
and negative values refer to the perceived 
location of the stimulated hand being away 
from the seen hand (however the interpreta-
tion of negative drift values in terms of illu-
sory ownership have, to our knowledge, not 
been thoroughly discussed in the literature).
Data analysis
« 19 » since the questionnaire data were 
not normally distributed, Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests with Bonferroni correction were 
used to compare how the four experimental 
conditions affected ownership and agency. 
drift measures were normally distributed 
and analyzed in a 2 × 2 analysis of variance 
(anova) with the within-subject factors 
“time” (pre and post) and “synchrony” (syn-
chronous and asynchronous) for the visuo-
tactile domain. Results of questionnaire data: 
Ownership in the visuomotor condition was 
significantly higher for synchronous than 
for asynchronous stimulation (Z = 3.63, 
p(corr) < 0.001) while there was no signifi-
cant difference between synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation in the visuotactile 
condition (Z = 0.70, p(corr) = 1). ownership 
between the two conditions (visuotactile 
versus visuomotor) did not significantly dif-
fer for synchronous (Z = 1.5, p(corr) = 0.42) 
but did significantly differ for asynchronous 
stimulation (Z = 3.34, p(corr) = 0.002; with 
higher scores for the visuotactile than for the 
visuomotor condition). Agency in the visuo-
motor condition was significantly higher for 
synchronous than for asynchronous stimula-
tion (Z = 3.63, p(corr) < 0.001) while in the vi-
suotactile condition, there was no significant 
difference between synchronous and asyn-
chronous stimulation (Z = 0.90, p(corr) = 1). 
agency between the two conditions signifi-
cantly differed for synchronous stimulation 
(Z = 3.45, p(corr) = 0.002; with higher scores 
for the visuomotor than for the visuotactile 
stimulation) but not for asynchronous stim-
ulation (Z = 1.6, p(corr) = 0.32). Results of pro-
prioceptive drift data: There was a significant 
main effect of time (F(1, 17) = 12, p = 0.003) but 
not of synchrony and no interaction between 
the two (F values < 2.8, p > 0.11).
experimental setup
results
Participant
Has the hand stroked 
while seeing 
the performer’s hand 
on the HMD
HMD showing the point of view of the performer from the webcam feed
Performer
Has the hand stroked
either in synchrony or not
with the participant’s
own hand
Participant
Moves the hand slowly but
freefly while seeing the 
performer’s hand
on the HMD
Performer
Follows the movements
of the participant either
synchronously or
asynchronously
Visuotactile condition
Visuomotor condition
1
1
Motor-controlled webcam feeding the HMD and following its orientation2
1
2
2
Ownership
VT sync
3 10
cm
before
after
5
0
–5
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
VT async VM sync VM async VT sync VT async VT sync VT asyncVM sync VM async
Agency Proprioceptive drift
Figure 1 • First-person perspective full-body illusion in a task of synchronous (sync) and asyn-
chronous (async) visuotactile (VT) and visuomotor (VM) hand stimulation during full-body 
swapping with another human. The boxplots (in the bottom row) show the results of the ques-
tionnaire scores for body ownership (left) and the agency subscale (middle) as well as for the 
degree of proprioceptive drift (negative values represent distance away from the seen hand) 
for the visuotactile conditions before and after stimulation (right).
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Discussion
« 20 » illusory ownership was found in 
all conditions except in the asynchronous 
visuomotor condition. notably, illusory 
ownership was induced even during asyn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation. This is 
confirmed by the proprioceptive drift to-
wards the virtual hand both in the synchro-
nous and asynchronous visuotactile condi-
tions. For the subjective feeling of agency, 
the scores were significantly higher during 
synchronous visuomotor stimulation when 
compared to all the other conditions. in 
contrast to the model proposed by Maselli 
and slater (2013), our data show that even 
with visuoproprioceptive spatial mismatch-
es, asynchronous visuotactile stimulation 
during 1PP FBi results in illusory owner-
ship. our results also show that even with a 
head-matched video-based (not computer-
generated) setup visuotactile asynchrony is 
not enough to reduce body ownership.
integration with gallagher’s 
paradigm: implications for 
the body image and schema
« 21 » We discussed how FBis alter the 
way in which sensorimotor signals are in-
tegrated and provided arguments for a dis-
sociation between head-related and limb-
related sensorimotor coherence. We now 
attempt to fit our discussion to the concepts 
of body image and body schema as dis-
cussed by Gallagher (2005b). The demarca-
tion between the mentioned concepts has 
many important subtleties to consider, but 
we would like to begin the discussion by 
addressing two questions proposed by Gal-
lagher: “to what extent, and in what precise 
way, does one’s body appear as part of one’s 
perceptual field?” and “to what extent, and 
in what precise way, does one’s body con-
strain or shape the perceptual field?” (Galla-
gher 2005b: 17). in Gallagher’s opinion, the 
concept of body image is useful to address 
the first question, while that of body schema 
is useful for the second. For further clarifica-
tion of the difference between body image 
and body schema, we quote Gallagher’s pro-
visional definition:9
9 | since our purpose is to match our em-
pirically informed hypothesis with the author’s 
“ a body image consists of a system of percep-
tions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s 
own body. in contrast, a body schema is a system 
of sensory-motor capacities that function without 
awareness of the necessity of perceptual monitor-
ing. This conceptual distinction between body 
image and body schema is related respectively to 
the difference between having a perception of (or 
belief about) something and having a capacity to 
move (or an ability to do something).” (Galla-
gher 2005b: 24)
« 22 » regarding the body image, Gal-
lagher (2005b) further explores three con-
ceptual distinctions emanating from the 
literature. These are
  body percept: the subject’s perceptual 
experience of his/her own body;
  body concept: the subject’s conceptual 
understanding (including folk and/or 
scientific knowledge) of the body in 
general; and
  body affect: the subject’s emotional atti-
tude towards his/her own body.10
during both iLi and 1PP FBis, it is the body 
percept that is initially manipulated when 
participants look at their new bodies or 
limbs; their perceptual experience becomes 
determined by another limb/body. How-
ever, it seems that the seen body has to fit 
within certain boundaries of a body con-
cept for the illusion to occur. such a body 
concept is not necessarily conscious (Galla-
gher 2005b). as mentioned in the previous 
sections, the literature shows that not just 
any fake body or object can elicit illusory 
ownership (e.g., Lenggenhager et al. 2007; 
Maselli et al. 2016; Maselli & slater 2013; 
tsakiris & Haggard 2005). Yet, in the pres-
ence of sensorimotor coherence, there are 
some examples of illusory ownership over 
implausible virtual bodies (Maseli and slat-
er 2013; ahn et al. 2016). More remarkably, 
and following our previous discussion, dur-
ing 1PP FBi only bodies resembling human 
bodies very closely, that is, adhering to a 
plausible body concept (cf. section “Empiri-
distinction rather than to thoroughly discuss the 
two concepts, we will use Gallagher’s provisional 
definition as a working definition.
10 | While body affect certainly plays a role 
in FBis, it is not strictly relevant to our argument 
and is – unfortunately – outside the scope of the 
current article.
cal study” and Maselli & slater 2013), result 
in illusory self-identification even during 
asynchronous feedback.11
« 23 » as for the body schema, Gal-
lagher (2005b) defines it as “a system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function 
without awareness of the necessity of per-
ceptual monitoring” (Gallagher 2005b: 24). 
While the relationship between these sen-
sorimotor capacities and the body schema 
is quite general (Maravita, spence & driver 
2003), Frédérique de vignemont (2010) 
argues that apart from conceptual differ-
ences between several authors, there is 
some agreement that the body schema is 
distinguished by its role in guiding action. 
in this context, de vignemont discusses 
various experimental results regarding 
the dissociation of body schema and body 
image during iLi. For example, one study 
shows an effect of altering body image 
during iLi on body schema, as manifested 
by grasping (Kammers et al. 2010). in the 
study, participants’ motor programs were 
manipulated after visuotactile stimulation 
in an rHi-like protocol. However, another 
study reported different results for proprio-
ceptive drift (Kammers et al. 2009). in that 
study, participants exhibited a drift towards 
the rH when carefully pointing at or when 
referring verbally to the position of their 
finger, but not when pointing at it through 
ballistic motor action.12 it seems that ac-
tion commands were thus not affected by 
the illusion. However, pointing may not be 
ideal for measuring modified motor com-
mands (see de vignemont 2010). While de 
vignemont (2010) has integrated divergent 
findings from iLi studies in an attempt to 
disentangle body image and body schema, 
11 | during 1PP FBi, implausible bodies may 
also result in illusory ownership (see ahn et al. 
2016, for an example) but only through synchro-
nous sensorimotor stimulation.
12 | a ballistic motor action, or ballistic 
movement, is a rapid motor action requiring fast 
muscular activation. in this context, we contrast 
this type of action with that of carefully moving 
and adjusting movement based on other sensory 
input. according to de vignemont, a ballistic mo-
tor action “should be entirely accounted for by 
commands existing before its initiation executed 
without visual feedback” (de vignemont 2010: 
674).
Co
gn
it
iv
e 
SC
ie
nC
e 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
tS
 in
 e
na
Ct
iv
iS
m
102
 ConstruCtivist Foundations vol. 14, n°1
we propose that 1PP FBis may be more ap-
plicable in demonstrating how body image 
and body schema interact during bodily il-
lusions.
« 24 » Manipulations of body image 
could be considered the most important as-
pect of 1PP FBis. using immersive HMds, 
the perspective of a humanoid body can 
induce illusory ownership by replacing 
one’s perceptual field with that of another 
body. in contrast to iLi, 1PP FBis occupy 
the entire visual field over a full body, with 
the possibility of additionally mapping 
new visual perceptual fields according to 
our head movements (i.e., our optic flow). 
in some cases, this even results in illusory 
ownership over the fake body despite asyn-
chronous sensorimotor stimulation (see 
above). Moreover, the time window of 
sensorimotor integration has been report-
ed to widen during illusory ownership in 
1PP FBis (Maselli et al. 2016). if we refer 
to these changes in sensorimotor integra-
tion as modifications of the sensorimotor 
capacities (to stick to the definition in Gal-
lagher 2005b), we can address them as ma-
nipulations of the body schema. Thus, if the 
body image is manipulated to a certain de-
gree in terms of the body percept and body 
concept, then the body schema changes. 
Fittingly, visually manipulating the angular 
mismatch of arm movements between the 
seen and the participant’s own bodies dur-
ing 1PP FBis has been shown to affect the 
size estimation of surrounding space (Kok-
kinara et al. 2015).
« 25 » remarkably, Maselli and slater 
(2013) demonstrated that only when head 
motion was permitted did participants at-
tribute the felt touch to the virtual (seen) 
object during asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation. Hence, there seems to be a 
link between head-related visuoproprio-
ceptive coherence during 1PP FBis and the 
integration of sensorimotor signals (see 
above). Head movements, coupled with 
the strength with which the visual field is 
manipulated during 1PP FBis, seem to be 
enough for the image-schema interaction to 
occur. While not enough empirical studies 
have systematically manipulated the senso-
rimotor coherences related to head move-
ments, we argue that there is something 
unique about such head-related coherences. 
according to Gallagher,
“ neurologically, the body schema depends on 
proprioceptive/kinesthetic/vestibular (and other 
sensory afferent) processes, registering in central-
ly organized neural matrixes, and issuing in (ef-
ferent) motor control commands.” (Gallagher 
2005a: 239)
all of which are involved in head move-
ments. in addition, head movements alter 
perspectival visual information in a way 
that peripheral-limb movements do not. if 
it is clear that head movements are a special 
sensorimotor process, and there is evidence 
of this process having an influence on the 
integration of sensorimotor signals during 
1PP FBi, what would happen if we break the 
temporal match of head-related sensorimo-
tor signals? Would the image still integrate 
with the schema?
« 26 » While this is currently purely 
speculative, our hypothesis is that breaking 
the temporal matching of sensorimotor in-
tegration related to head movements would 
prevent the manipulation of body schema by 
body image during 1PP FBis. However, this 
should and could be experimentally tested. 
in our view, coherence between head move-
ment and the visual field embodying a full 
humanoid body works as an integrating el-
ement between the two concepts proposed 
by Gallagher. an experimentally induced 
temporal mismatch in head-related senso-
rimotor signals could alter the body schema 
in such a way that participants may struggle 
with their motor commands. Yet, following 
our argument we believe that such changes 
in the body schema will not be consistent 
or bound to the body image presented on 
the HMds. While it seems that temporal 
mismatches related to the peripheral body 
do not necessarily break the image-schema 
interaction, we hypothesize that temporal 
mismatches related to head movements 
would.
« 27 » if the schema and the image were 
not integrated during mismatched head-re-
lated sensorimotor stimulation, the question 
remains whether the seen body (from 1PP) 
would still be considered one’s own body 
(image). We believe this to be the case, since
  our (primarily visual) perceptual field 
(or visual body percept) over our body 
has changed, and
  the foreign body may still fit the param-
eters of body percept and body concept.
« 28 » in the most radical simile to our 
own body image, we could imagine an exper-
iment using an HMd and live video where 
participants see their own bodies from a 
1PP, yet the visuomotor responses related to 
their head movements are not matched. in 
this hypothetical experiment, the body im-
age would remain that of our own bodies, 
but the integration with our body schema 
would be broken by mismatching head-re-
lated visuomotor responses.
Conclusion
« 29 » We have attempted to integrate 
recent experimental literature on illu-
sions of the bodily self and our own data 
(cf. section “Empirical study”) – showing 
conflicting results in terms of the temporal 
constraints for sensorimotor integration 
during bodily illusions – with Gallagher’s 
distinction between body image and body 
schema. in our argument, we distinguished 
the integration of sensorimotor signals 
during two types of bodily illusions, illu-
sory limb identification and first-person 
perspective full-body illusions, and pro-
posed a dissociation between head- and 
limb-related sensorimotor integration. We 
emphasized head-related sensorimotor sig-
nals as a possible binding factor between 
body image and body schema in the con-
text of 1PP FBis.
« 30 » While purely speculative at the 
moment, this distinction could be impor-
tant for the scientific study of the bodily self 
and might motivate future experiments, for 
which we have outlined experimental de-
signs and hypotheses. to date, sensorimo-
tor signals related to the body have been 
ascribed to a single category (conflating the 
head and the peripheral body). a distinc-
tion between head- and limb-related signals 
could refine experimental procedures aimed 
to further our understanding of the plastic-
ity of the bodily self and sensorimotor inte-
gration. new ways to modify the bodily self 
and the integration of body image and body 
schema could also be applied in the clinical 
context (e.g., for motor-/neuro-rehabilita-
tion).
« 31 » to summarize, given that the 
seen image fits a body concept of the body 
image during 1PP FBis, our body image 
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(i.e., the perceptual field showing a foreign 
body) may modify our body schema (i.e., 
how we integrate sensorimotor signals). 
We hypothesize that if we were to break 
head-related body schematic coherence, 
the interaction between body image and 
body schema would not occur. This con-
veys a seemingly paradoxical idea regarding 
bodily illusions: while these illusions are a 
result of the experimental procedure, they 
are also a cause of their own resistance to 
sensorimotor incoherence. in other words, 
the resistance to the illusion partly depends 
on parameters of the illusion itself. our hy-
pothesis is that the perception of immersive 
1PP optic-flow coherence to head move-
ments is a parameter with enough strength 
to alter the illusion itself. By attempting to 
synthesize recent results (from others and 
from us) and integrate them with philo-
sophical considerations, we aim to further 
our understanding of what constitutes the 
bodily self, and what accounts for its re-
markable plasticity.
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> abstract • In my commentary, I raise 
some questions about the applicability 
of Gallagher’s distinction between body 
image and body schema to the experi-
mental research reported and discussed 
in the target article. I suggest that the 
distinction between body image and 
body schema is of limited help in this 
context, and that Gallagher’s distinction 
between sense of ownership and sense 
of agency provides a more natural and 
fruitful theoretical framework to discuss 
that research.
« 1 » The possibility of inducing il-
lusions of bodily ownership and bodily 
agency over foreign limbs and full foreign 
bodies has given rise to a thought-provok-
ing literature about the constituents and 
malleability of the human sense of bodily 
self. Marte roel Lesur et al.’s target article 
illustrates nicely how the experimental ma-
nipulation of sensorimotor signals, in tan-
dem with technological advances, enables 
an increasingly fine-grained investigation 
of the bodily self, and in particular of the 
role that different sensorimotor factors 
play in bodily illusions. The authors focus 
on two types of illusions: the illusory limb 
identification (iLi) (§3) – a paradigm of 
which is the rubber hand illusion – and 
first-person perspective full-body illusions 
(1PP FBi) (§4), in which a subject wearing 
a head-mounted display gains virtual access 
to the perceptual and embodied perspec-
tive of someone else. While i agree with the 
authors that investigating different types 
of bodily signals during bodily illusions 
can shed light on the sense of bodily self, 
i have reservations about the way in which 
they link their discussion with shaun Galla-
gher’s distinction between body image and 
body schema. i will briefly suggest that Gal-
lagher’s distinction between sense of own-
ership and sense of agency could be more 
open peer Commentaries
on marte roel Lesur et al.’s “the plasticity of the Bodily Self”
